The differences in approach do not seem to be dictated by different doctrinal and ecclesiastical positions. In fact, members of the same confessional traditions can differ substantially in their attitude towards scholarship. Where do the differences come from? In the following pages, I propose the thesis that such differences have much to do with the different Christian worldviews².

A basic purpose of this article is to show that by studying the Christian attitudes in scholarship along worldview-lines, we can obtain a fair understanding of the trends and positions in this field. Another purpose is to show that worldviews and attitudes are not just the same, and one needs to make appropriate choices. This article also aims, therefore, at empowering the reader for making better choices by indicating the basic strategies of the main Christian worldviews, their basic starting points, their problems and their resources.

Although the present topic has already received considerable attention within Christian and (more specifically) reformational circles (cf. Niebuhr 1956; Olthuis 1970; Wolters 1990; Van der Walt 2001) this article is not a mere survey of past contributions. In fact, it introduces and explores the particular ‘versions’ of most of the worldviews (see scheme below). Furthermore, such versions are discussed in relation to authors who were not mentioned in previous works on this topic. Finally, the possibility of ‘mixing’ the worldviews (i.e. the possibility of an eclectic approach) is also discussed.

Common to most of these approaches is a wish to account for the relationship between theology and scholarship (after the initial distinction along nature-grace lines). Another common trait is the belief that today’s theology is not credible to the contemporary man, the ‘bridge’ between theology and science is damaged³ and a better interaction with the ‘scientific age’ is the key to recover the poor reputation of theology. The nature-grace approaches differ, however, on the relationship that they wish to establish between the two ‘realms’.

The reformational model has a different starting point. Although it could be described (in terms of the nature-grace terminology) as ‘grace transforming nature’ (cf. Wolters 1990), I would argue that the nature-grace formula does not adequately define this approach. In fact, the latter does not start from a two-realm distinction. Following this model, scholarship and religious ground motives are always and already integrated, and the reconciliation between secular science and theology (often incorrectly identified with religion or Christianity) is not perceived as a major problem.

Before proceeding, it is appropriate to specify that, although worldviews are traditionally related to a certain ecclesiastical or confessional tradition (Catholic, Lutheran, etc.), the adoption of a worldview does not always imply the adoption of the related ecclesiastical or doctrinal tradition as well.

A brief preliminary survey of the basic consequences of the adoption of each worldview might be helpful.

Finally, the Reformational worldview tries to escape the nature-grace duality and affirms that everything in reality and culture is created, fallen, but also open to restoration. The articulation of a Christian philosophy and scholarship in dialogue with other trends, is the relevant trait of this approach.

In the next sections, we are going to articulate the hypothesis that there is a fair correlation between the main worldviews and the way science and scholarship are conceived and pursued within Christian circles. We will also associate some worldviews with specific movements and authors, although we will hopefully resist the temptation of simply ‘fitting’ authors in narrow boxes created or required by our own method.

Of course, the fact that an academic may take faith and theology into account may create certain differences in their approach to scholarship. Theology may not question the results of the sciences but can influence or even direct them according to the motto ‘gratia natura non tollit, sed perficit’ [grace does not eliminate nature but perfects it]. Historically speaking, perficit has been mainly understood as (1) to complete, to bring to perfection and (2) to elevate. However, completion (or integration) has normally overshadowed elevation (Veenhof 1994:9). This is illustrated in our scheme by calling ‘integration’ the basic idea of this model.

On the one hand, theology will therefore try to influence scholarship. Conversely, although the extra-theological sciences are not supposed to prescribe anything in the theological domain, they remain ancillae [handmaids] and they can, as a consequence, offer an external support to theology. The Catholic tradition, therefore, does not endorse a simplistic model but rather promotes a ‘symphonic’ cooperation of the different disciplines.

On the less positive side, one may notice that control does not imply any transformation of ‘nature’ but rather integration: Grace ‘floats’ on top of nature like oil floating on water (Bavinck 1888:21). In addition, although grace remains in control of nature and performs the necessary integration, control is achieved on the basis of a previous synthesis or accommodation.⁴ The most famous example concerns the scholastic synthesis between Christian doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy.

As the secular theories and trends in a certain field are usually many, which ones should be selected to be integrated in such a synthesis? The Catholic approach tends to opt for moderation, balance and catholicity (i.e. universality). The Christian position, when possible, should reflect and incorporate in itself the entire spectrum of the available options (the specific positions will then be regarded as fragments or aspects of the universal or Catholic fullness). In politics, for example, the Catholic parties tend to occupy the ‘centre’, a position from which the ‘opposite extremes’ are incorporated and moderated.⁵

In the creation-evolution debate the theory of evolution is accepted but integrated by means of a non-deistic interpretation and (in the case of human evolution) by the doctrine of the addition of the soul to the bodies of the first human beings. This may be regarded as a form of theistic evolutionism. However, it is not the only option available to the Catholic scholar.⁶

Before moving to some examples, we can just point out that, in Catholic circles, the strategy of ‘control’ has not been the only option. It is also possible to find a shelter in the superior realm of grace. Historically, this attitude is illustrated by phenomena like monasticism and mysticism which are endorsed, however, much less frequently than the control-approach.

Murphy’s plan, however, includes also the recovery of a better role for theology, which is for the moment still relegated to a position of scarce reliability. How can one achieve this goal? Murphy’s (1990:174−191) strategy is to show that theology meets the standards of scientific rationality.

Unfortunately, no transcendental critique of those standards is in view, and she has no hesitation in adopting a secular approach. A better demarcation criterion

(Coletto 2011a:76−77, 2011b) would be available in Christian philosophy, but for Murphy, secular is synonymous to ‘public’. Nevertheless, why would she prefer Lakatos’s demarcation criterion to the one provided by, for example, Kuhn or Popper? Of course, she argues that Lakatos’ philosophy is preferable, but it is not difficult to see that she chooses the author who allows her to conclude that theology can be scientific.

In fact, theology is declared scientific (Murphy 1990:88−173), or at least, all the theological trends which (in line with Lakatos’s philosophy) can be regarded as progressive ‘research programmes’ can be declared scientific. Once this has been achieved, Murphy’s next question, in line with the ‘above nature’ approach, is: Can theology also influence or direct other sciences? The answer is affirmative (Murphy 1985; 1990:197−198), and therefore, the Catholic approach finds in this scholar a perfect supporter.

I would like to briefly mention a second example. I (Coletto 2009:31) have recently explored the hypothesis that (at least some authors in) the Vantilian school, although officially defending and promoting a reformed position, may in fact be (at least in part) representative of a Catholic approach to scholarship.

In fact, the way theology is treated, defined and used shows clear links with the ‘above nature’ scheme.⁷ In practice, theology assumes amongst the sciences the same position as the clergy in the Catholic Church. As a detailed discussion of the similarities between the two areas (ecclesiastical and encyclopaedic) would require too much space, I refer the reader to my (Coletto 2009) article.

In the first version, parallelism may lead to isolation of the two realms, to the point that they have little in common. In classical geometry, two lines are parallel when they never touch each other, even if extended ad infinitum. One may think for example of Cardinal Baronio who, dealing with the Copernican controversy, coined the famous sentence: ‘The Bible is about how to go to heaven, not about how the heavens go’. In this case, the two realms are kept in peaceful co-existence but also in stern isolation (the Bible has nothing to say, basically, on scholarly issues). Now, most Christians perceive this position as un-convincing. Its moment of truth lies in the idea that the Bible is not a ‘manual’ for astronomy or chemistry, but does it mean that it has nothing at all to say on those issues?

On the other hand, parallelism might be interpreted in a more ‘concordist’ sense, to borrow Blocher’s (1984:5) term. In this case, there will be a strong inclination at harmonising what we read in the Bible with the (most recent) findings (e.g. of biology, politics or economics).

We may also observe that, systematically speaking, concordance can deviate in two directions: A certain priority may be attributed to theology or to non-theological sciences. The more priority is given to theology, the more one moves towards a Catholic position (i.e. theology above scholarship). On the other hand, the more one follows the opposite direction, the more one is open to a Liberal approach (we may call it ‘science above theology’).⁸ In order to remain within the Lutheran worldview, therefore, concordance must be characterised by moderation and balance.

These last observations constitute a first acknowledgment of the fact that the nature-grace worldviews are not closed compartments but rather variations of the same basic pattern originating in Catholic Christianity. Other possible inter-connections (or oppositions) between the models will be pointed out below. For the moment, let us focus on some examples of isolation and concordance.

Barth even eliminates all links between the sphere of rationality (nature) and the sphere of theology (grace). Due to this fact, Olthuis (1970:121) places Barth within the Anabaptist model. Whilst this may be slightly excessive, it is not unreasonable, especially considering that Barth reaches the well-known conclusion that developing a Christian philosophy is not possible and that theology should not look for philosophical support.⁹ However, the dialectical nature of his theology fits quite well, in my opinion, in the isolation-type of worldview.

One issue to explore further is the possible link between the Lutheran and Kantian attitudes of isolation. Although stemming from different ground motives (one Christian and one humanist), they present considerable similarities. This, however, is about the past.

The harmonising attitude emerges, for example, when it comes to the age-old issue of the creation-evolution debate. If I am allowed to leave apart specific authors for a moment and to focus on ideas, consider for example how in some circles the ‘days’ of Genesis 1 became the long eras accredited by modern science, whilst God’s creational fiat could be imagined as a ‘big bang’.

This approach is not without its problems. The Bible should be understood for what is says and not constantly adapted to our latest theories. True, in our exegesis, we are influenced by our culture, and science is part of culture. Yet, Blocher (1984:25) is right when saying that, in biblical exegesis, science and scholarship should have a ministerial role, not a magisterial one. Secondly, science is not a monolithic block, and one can only please a few scientists at a time (whilst displeasing others who support rival theories). Finally, scientists are not easily ‘pleased’ by what they sometimes perceive as a chameleon-strategy (i.e. changing when the theories change).

Generally speaking, concordance will never oppose secular positions with determination (e.g. in ethical matters) on the basis of a Christian standpoint. Whenever a secular position is widely accepted, the ‘harmonisers’ are likely to plead for its acceptance within the Christian community.¹⁰ One must admit that the Catholic approach is much more ‘resistant’. The same can be said about the Anabaptist approach, to which we may now turn.

The moment of truth in this approach (cf. Blocher 1984:21−22) is the intuition that rationality is not neutral and that secular science can be evaluated in its fundamental assumptions and crypto-religious commitments. This is a very valuable insight, which is shared by the reformational approach but is completely absent in all the others. The absence of such insight is due to the very structure of these worldviews,¹² and it curtails one’s understanding of secular scholarship quite severely.

Even in the Anabaptist approach, two alternative versions of the basic paradigm can be distinguished. Given the conflict, grace can protect itself from nature or can try to overcome nature.

The first option is a strategy of separation: Create your own community and cultivate your alternative culture within it, without much contact with the ‘world’. (This is the route followed e.g. by many Amish and Mennonite communities in America). In this case, the worldview is not too far from the isolation version of the Lutheran approach and from the mystical or monastic version of the Catholic model mentioned above,¹³ but it constitutes a more radical version of the two.

There is also a second strategy available to the Anabaptists: They may decide to try and overpower the secular Leviathan. The basic idea of the substitution strategy is that ‘nature’ can be uprooted and replaced by ‘grace’. This is, for example, what happened during the revolts of Münster (1534) or in other revolutionary attempts at establishing some or another ‘republic of the saints’.

From this particular point of view, one may consider the Anabaptist approach as the opposite of the Lutheran approach: Instead of positing harmony between nature and grace, a basic conflict is assumed. And yet, we can observe that the two approaches present some convergent traits, especially between Lutheran isolation and Anabaptist separation. Let us present some concrete examples of Anabaptist approaches.

Do examples of the second approach (i.e. substitution) exist? Some will be surprised at my hypothesis that this version of the Anabaptist worldview may be shaping the Theonomic or Reconstructionist movements. The latter is not easily or intuitively associated with Anabaptism because of its adoption of reformed ‘vocabulary’ and doctrine, its origins in the Presbyterian circles of North America and its association with Kuyper and Van Til. And yet, I find in this group exactly an attempt at ‘overpowering’ nature with grace. This is attempted, for example, in the project of replacing the American legislation with laws obtained directly from the Bible. The Anabaptists did the same in Münster, with some uncertainties concerning whether only the New Testaments or the whole Bible should constitute their legislation. Theonomists are not the only movement supporting a Christian influence in legislation, of course, but their ‘replacement’ strategy is quite unique.

A similar attitude is sometimes adopted in the creation-evolution debate. For most Christians, the first chapters of Genesis provide general guidelines to understand several facets of our universe (in this, they rightly oppose isolationist parallelism). For the Creationist, however, such information is to be taken literally, it is scientific in character, and it constitutes a sort of historical record. It is then used to undertake (replace) whatever information is provided by secular natural- scientific circles.

The ‘moment of truth’ in this attitude is the realisation that science is never neutral, and often, what is smuggled as factual discovery is just appealing theory. Nevertheless, replacing whatever theory with data obtained from a literalist understanding of Scripture is only possible within an Anabaptist ‘paradigm’.

Klapwijk (2008:10, 22) regards this branch of creationism as performing a Biblicist adaptation or ‘intertwinement’, but in my opinion, Blocher (1984:19) better understands this approach when he defines it as ‘anti-intellectual’. He recalls that the prefix anti originally means both ‘against’ and ‘in the place of’. In some instances, creationism betrays precisely the desire to abolish secular science and to substitute it with the Bible, in a strategy in which grace overwhelms nature.

It is interesting to note that many in the Theonomic movement (including a major figure like Rushdoony) are in fact creationists. In terms of our worldview-analysis, this is hardly surprising. It may also be interesting to know that the creationist movement in the USA received strong impulse from Adventist circles (Numbers 1992), in which the Anabaptist worldview was dominant.¹⁴

Basically, whilst in the Catholic tradition there is an attempt at influencing secular scholarship through theology, in the Liberal tradition secular scholarship is invited to influence and even shape Christian theology. In this sense, perhaps the Liberal worldview could be described by the formula ‘nature above grace’ (see fn. 8), which is the opposite of the Catholic approach. Or should rather the Anabaptist worldview be regarded as the opposite of the Liberal approach (see Olthuis 1970)? After all, in the Anabaptist model, we find opposition to (instead of identification with) a ‘natural’ trend. Whatever the answer, let us move to some concrete examples.

Whether this attitude is perhaps partially present in Klapwijk’s (1986) proposal of selecting ideas from secular philosophy and integrating them into a reformational worldview (discussed below), is something which might be worth debating. It should be noticed, however, that in addition to such ‘appropriations’, Klapwijk prescribes a previous transformation (sometimes called alteration) of the ideas to be introduced in a Christian (in his case reformational) worldview.

By contrast, this transformation or alteration phase is rather absent in the more recent writings of a well-known reformed scholar, Nicholas Wolterstorff. Since the middle 1980s, he has gradually abandoned the idea of elaborating new theories on the basis of an original Christian standpoint¹⁵ and rather supports the adoption of already existing theories mostly supplied by secular circles. In this sense, he recommends the ‘weighing’ (Wolterstorff 1989:56−80) of secular or humanist theories in order to appropriate the more suitable or tolerable ones to the Christian scholar. Along the same lines, he (1989:70ff.) argues that Christian scholarship is not always or necessarily ‘different’ from sound secular scholarship.

In a review of Until justice and peace embrace (Wolterstorff 1983), Marshall (1985) lucidly comments:

The first four chapters of the book, which comprise its systematic core, each lay out two options, insist that we must choose between the two options, and argue for the choice of a particular one. (...) Chapter 2 [calls for] a choice between ‘modernization’ theory and ‘world system’ theory; (...) Chapter 4 between the rich and the poor. (...) Christian understanding of the modern world is posed as a type of choice between pre-existing theories. (p. 91)

Coming to the second version of the Liberal paradigm, examples of elaboration-approaches are provided by Barbour, Van Huyssteen and Peacocke. Here, secular trends are not only adopted but also used to elaborate and shape Christian scholarship (in many cases restricted to theology).

Concerning Barbour, his work is shaped by a modern-science ideology. Another book review, in this case by Goheen (1992), criticises the starting point from which Barbour’s Religion in an age of science (1990) was written:

The first problem surfaces in the opening questions that set the agenda for this book: ‘What is the place of religion in an age of science? What view of God is consistent with the scientific understanding of the world?’ (...) The modern scientific worldview is taken as the plausibility structure for the entire discussion. One’s task is then to find a place for faith and theology within the reigning scientific worldview. (...) But it seems to me that this is backwards. The responsibility of the Christian is to attempt the much more difficult enterprise of trying to understand the place of modern science in the light of the Scriptures. (p. 25)

Coming to a second example, Van Huyssteen’s theology is deliberately based on evolutionary theory. The title of his 1998 book, Duel or duet?, gives the impression that he wants to create a sort of harmonious relationship between theology and science, pointing towards a Lutheran worldview. In fact, the ‘duel’ option (i.e. opposition) is out of question. Yet, what he proposes is a model in which evolutionary science completely shapes and determines his theorising.

Peacocke’s theology, by contrast, is sshaped by philosophy especially, more precisely by a panentheist ontology (Peacocke 2001:xvii; 57−58). Panentheism (meaning: everything is in God) is similar to pantheism (everything is God). Whilst the latter holds that nature is divine [Deus sive natura], Panentheism teaches that, in ontological terms, creation is in God, or part of God. In this case, God is not identified with creation, but the distinction between creation and creator is definitely compromised. One of the most striking consequences, in my opinion, is that for Peacocke (2001:45), God has only ‘probabilistic knowledge’ of the future, as he cannot predict events which will take place in this ‘open universe’! What can be predicted, I would say, is that when unbiblical ontologies and world-pictures dictate one’s doctrine of God, the results can only be perplexing.

These are a few examples of Liberal theorising controlled by secular starting points, and with this, we have also reached the end of our examination of the nature-grace worldviews. Let us now move to the reformational approach.

This approach does not regard some sciences as especially related to the sphere of grace and the others as related to ‘nature’. In addition, it does not relate theology to faith especially and the rest of scholarship to reason. It rather relates all the sciences to both faith and reason, and both faith and reason are rooted in a religious motif. This is true of all schools and traditions, Christian or non-Christian.

In fact, theology is as related to scientific reason as science or philosophy are, and both are also connected to a religious ground motive which ‘directs’ reason in a particular direction (towards or away from God’s revelation). Theology is a science, not because Lakatos says so but because its point of entry to the study of reality is a modal aspect of created reality (Coletto 2011a:73; 76−77). Secular science is not without its own religious foundation, and Christian spirituality is not without its own scholarly expressions.

The pretension that secular science is somehow ‘neutral’ and the Christian ‘faith’ is detached from scholarship should therefore be un-masked. One of the premises often adopted by authors in the ‘integration movement’ (Van der Walt 2005) is that theology is inherently Christian whilst the other sciences are inherently neutral or secular. Along this line of discourse, the dialogue between Christian and non-Christian scholars is supposed to be mainly a dialogue between Christian theologians and non-Christian scientists or scholars. From a reformational perspective, in contrast, such dialogue should take place between Christian and non-Christian scholarship. In fact, philosophy, biology, history, law and all other disciplines can be Christian or non-Christian in their orientation.

The impression that modern science enjoys unlimited credibility should be radically revised and adjusted, at least to the developments of contemporary philosophy of science since Kuhn, Toulmin and others. We are not living in a ‘scientific age’ anymore (a phrase appearing often in integration-literature). We live in a postmodern culture in which rationality has been drastically resized, and other agencies lead the dances.

The reason why sound Christian theology does not earn the respect of all does not lie mainly in its lack of ‘scientific status’. Here a gross under-estimation of the religious antithesis is at work, together with an illusion created by the absolute lack of transcendental critique, namely that integrating Christian theology with ‘neutral’ (in fact: secular) science will restore the credibility of theology.

My main example in this context is the reflection on the age-old problem of the universals, originating the conflict between realism and nominalism. Whilst for example Wolterstorff (1970) has simply adopted realism, Hart (1984) has followed a reformational attitude. Alhough appreciating the moments of truth in both realism and nominalism, he elaborated a ‘third way’ in which the universals are regarded as ‘nomic conditions’ (i.e. God’s structural order for creation).

As I have often mentioned the creation-evolution debate in the previous pages, in this context, one major characteristic of the reformational approach has been a Christian critique of the basic assumptions of evolutionism (cf. Hart 1984:135−144; Strauss 2009:105−118). Such critique then moved towards the identification of several flaws (e.g. concerning change and constancy, the confusion between the biotic and physical modalities and so on). The creationist position, however, has been criticised as well (e.g. Clouser 2006:49−54). Furthermore, in view of a more positive contribution, Klapwijk (2008) has, for example, revisited the idea of ‘emergence’ in an original way, and Strauss has linked the discussion to the role of distinct type laws. He notices that scientific evidence still points towards discontinuous diversity, rather reflecting the ordering of such laws.

Once the scholastic motive prevailed, the possibility of a truly biblical standpoint in Christian scholarship was compromised, and an attitude of synthesis and accommodation prevailed. In the Catholic approach, Greek ontology was accommodated to the ecclesiastical doctrine without realising that it is basically incompatible with the biblical idea of creation, with the unity of the human being and with other fundamental biblical themes (cf. Strauss & Bos 1999).

Even in our times, the nature-grace ‘paradigm’ is responsible for drawing many Christian circles into pseudo-problems, often accompanied by pseudo-solutions. The problem of the integration of Christian theology and secular science is to a large extent one of these problems. I realise that the integration-movement (cf. Sinnema 2001; Van der Walt 2005) is popular, powerful and even wealthy, as it is supported by a large ‘federation’ of nature-grace approaches. Yet a solid biblical approach is to be preferred.

This article could be concluded here, but I suspect that some of the readers might ask themselves at this point whether it would not be better to endorse a combination of approaches, perhaps even adopting all the Christian worldviews together. Is it not better to be inclusive rather than exclusive? The possibility of an eclectic approach will therefore be explored in the following sections.

Mixing some of the nature-grace types of worldviews is also possible de facto because they share the common denominator of the nature-grace distinction. Even in this case, however, it should be observed that not all the combinations are equally plausible, and some nature-grace worldviews are fairly incompatible with others. For example, trying to combine together Anabaptism and Liberalism or adopting them in different areas of reflection can easily result in all sorts of tensions.

However, one can also detect a more secular (humanist) worldview informing some areas of Polanyi’s philosophical reflection. Anastasiou (1979:104−105) shows that the philosophy of the Hungarian thinker is characterised by a Christian approach to epistemology and a humanist (i.e. vitalist-like) approach to ontology. Indeed, in his later works, Polanyi developed what I have called (Coletto 2007:115)

a ‘late-modern line’, which is not much dissimilar from Kuhn’s partially relativist approach.

Polanyi might therefore have ‘mixed’ not only Christian worldviews but also Christian and humanist worldviews. It should be noticed, however, that the price he had to pay for it was a gradual drift into partially-subjectivist positions (Coletto 2007:121−123). The synthesis between Christian and secular idea s and views is an attempt at uniting iron and clay (Vollenhoven 1933:16, 306) or at building on the sand: It may work for a while but it is never advisable. One may still be a great scholar, but not a great Christian scholar.

Even though some of the worldviews characterised by the nature-grace denominator may be partially compatible, adopting uneven approaches in scholarship will easily result in tensions. Finally, those who adopt the reformational approach should be aware that they choose a worldview which is largely incompatible with the nature-grace patterns. This does of course not mean that there cannot be communication, appreciation, cooperation or whatever other form of interaction. It simply means that interaction is different from confusion.

I trust that I have also shown that the Christian approaches are not ‘just the same’. I have also indicated which worldview should be preferred by the Christian scholar (i.e. the reformational worldview), due to the fact that it reflects the central biblical motive in a fuller and more integral way. Without downplaying other approaches completely, and without disregarding dialogue and interaction, I have argued that the reformational worldview provides the most consistent biblical approach.

On the other hand, this call is particularly directed to

Christians from reformed circles. Too often Christian academics who regard themselves as belonging to this confessional tradition adopt in fact positions and strategies which have little to do with it. We have theologians and pastors who plan to work within a reformed community on the basis of some neo-Thomistic or quasi-Pentecostal worldview. We have academics attending a reformed church, voting for a liberal party and promoting postmodernist scholarship. Some are positivists in philosophy, pragmatists in their career, conservative in their ethics and so on and on. Whilst psychological assistance may in some cases help to a certain extent, a better understanding of the differences amongst worldviews might help improving one’s consistency even more.

Barbour, I., 1990, Religion in an age of science, Harper & Row, New York, NY. 

Bavinck, H., 1888, De katholiciteit van christendom en kerk, Kampen Teologische Universiteit, Kampen.

Blocher, H., 1984, La creazione, l’inizio della Genesi, G.B.U., Roma.

Clouser, R.A., 2006, ‘Genesis re-gained: Creation, not creationism’, Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap/ Journal of Christian Scholarship 42 (Spesiale Uitgawe 1), 49−64.

Coletto, R., 2007, ‘The legitimacy crisis of science in late-modern philosophy: Towards a reformational response’, Doctoral thesis, Department of Philosophy, North-West University, Potchefstroom. 

Coletto, R., 2009, ‘Christian scholarship within reformed circles’, Acta Academica 41(3), 16−41.

Coletto, R., 2011a, ‘Science and non-science: The search for a demarcation criterion in the 20th century’, Journal for Christian Scholarship 47(1), 63−79.

Coletto, R., 2011b, ‘The elaboration of a demarcation criterion in reformational philosophy’, Acta Academica 43(2), 41−65.

Dooyeweerd, H., 1959, ‘Cinq conferences’, La revue réformée 10(3), 3−76.

Dooyeweerd, H., 1984, A new critique of theoretical thought, Paideia Press, Jordan Station.

Frame, J.M., 1987, The doctrine of the knowledge of God, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, Phillipsburg, NJ. 

Goheen, M., 1992, ‘Book review’, Pro rege 20(4), 25−26.

Hart, H., 1984, Understanding our world: An integral ontology, University Press of America, Lanham, MD. 

Klapwijk, J., 1986, ‘Antithesis, synthesis and the idea of transformational philosophy’, Philosophia Reformata 51(1/2), 138−152.

Klapwijk, J., 2008, Purpose in the living world? Creation and emergent evolution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813818

Marshall, P., 1985, ‘Book review’, Philosophia reformata 50(1), 89−93.

Murphy, N., 1985, ‘Theology: The transformer of science: A Neibuhrian typology for the relation of theology to science’, Pacific theological review 18(1), 16−23.

Murphy, N., 1990, Theology in the age of scientific reasoning, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

Niebuhr, H.R., 1956, Christ and culture, Harper & Row,  New York, NY.

Numbers, R.L., 1992, The evolution of scientific creationism, A.A. Knopf, New York, NY.

Olthuis, J.H., 1970, ‘Must the church become secular?’, in J. Olthuis, H. Hart & C. Seerveld (eds.), (eds.), Out of concern for the church, pp. 105−125, Wedge, Toronto.

Peacocke, A., 2001, Paths from science towards God: The end of all our exploring, Oneworld Publications, Oxford. 

Pierson, G.N., 2009, ‘Evangelicals and worldview confusion’, in J.M. Bonzo & M. Stevens  (eds.), After worldview: Christian higher education in postmodern worlds, pp. 29−42, Dordt College Press, Sioux Centre. 

Polanyi, M., 1946, Science, faith and society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

Sinnema, D., 2001, ‘Beyond integration to holistic Christian scholarship’, in J.H. Kok (ed.), Marginal resistance: Essays dedicated to J.C. Vander Stelt, pp. 187−208, Dordt College Press, Sioux Center. 

Strauss, D.F.M., 2009, Philosophy: The discipline of the disciplines, Paideia Press, Grand Rapids, MI. 

Strauss, D.F.M. & Bos, A.P., 1999, ‘Greek ontology and biblical cosmology: An unbridgeable gap’, Tydskrif vir Christelike Wetenskap 35(3/4), 137−163.

Van der Walt, B.J., 1994, The liberating message: A Christian worldview for Africa, North-West University (previously Potchefstroom University for C.H.E.) Institute for Reformational Studies, Potchefstroom.

Van der Walt, B.J., 2001, ‘The shape of an integral cosmoscope’, in J.H. Kok, (ed.), Marginal resistance: essays dedicated to J.C. Vander Stelt, pp. 71−88, Dordt College Press, Sioux Center. 

Van der Walt, B.J., 2005, ‘Integration or transformation? ”Faith and scholarship” or ”faith directed scholarship” as a starting point for Christian scientific endeavour’, in B.J. van der Walt (ed.), Transforming power: Challenging the contemporary secular society, pp. 319−346, Institute for Contemporary Christianity in Africa, Potchefstroom.

Van Huyssteen, J.W., 1998, Duet or duel?: Theology and science in a postmodern world, Trinity Press International, Harrisburg, PA. 

Van Niekerk, A.A., 2005, Geloof sonder sekerhede: Besinning vir eietydse gelowiges, Lux Verbi, Wellington. 

Veenhof, J., 1994, The relationship between nature and grace according to H. Bavinck, Institute for Reformational Studies, Potchefstroom.

Vollenhoven, D.H.Th., 1933, Het calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte, H.J. Paris, Amsterdam.

Wolters, A.M., 1990, ‘Christianity and the classics: A typology of attitudes’, in W.E. Helleman  (ed.), Christianity and the classics, pp. 189−203, University Press of America, Lanham, MD.

Wolterstorff, N.P., 1970, On universals: An essay in ontology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

Wolterstorff, N.P., 1976, Reason within the bounds of religion, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI.

Wolterstorff, N.P., 1983, Until justice and peace embrace, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI.

Wolterstorff, N.P., 1989, ‘On Christian learning’, in P.A. Marshall, S. Griffioen & R.J. Mouw (eds.), Stained glass: Worldviews and social science, pp. 56−80, University Press of America, Lanham, MD.

Yoder, J.H., 1994, The politics of Jesus, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, MI.